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The Scope of the Removal Power Is Ripe for Reconsideration

By Richard J. Pierce Jr.

I have been teaching and writing about the power of the president to remove officers of the United
States for over 40 years. Until recently, however, I have been content to describe the Supreme
Court’s opinions that address the scope issue without attempting to persuade the Court to change
its approach to the issue.
The issue has become particularly important in the last few years for two reasons. First, the
scope issue has become particularly important because of the increasing controversy that surrounds
the scope of the removal power in the context of officers who perform purely adjudicatory
functions. In its 2018 opinion in Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that SEC ALJs are officers
of the United States. 1 The holding is broad enough to encompass virtually all ALJs and AJs. 2 In a
brief filed in the Supreme Court in that case, the solicitor general (SG) tried to persuade the Court
to hold that the longstanding limits on the power to remove an ALJ are either invalid or
meaningless. 3 Those limits are based on due process. The Court decided not to address the removal
issue in that case, but it is only a matter of time until the Court addresses the issue.
The second reason the scope issue has become particularly important is tied to the growing
movement to broaden the scope of the power of the president to remove officers who perform
executive functions. C That effort is motivated by concern that limits on the removal power
interfere impermissibly with the president’s responsibility to perform the functions vested in the
president by Article II of the Constitution.
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Thus, for instance, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the removal power and
reduced the power of Congress to limit the removal power in its 2010 opinion in Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 4 The Court held that Congress cannot limit
the president’s removal power by imposing two or more layers of for cause limits on the removal
power. Because the president can only remove a member of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for cause, the Court wrote, the for cause limit on the SEC’s power to remove
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) violated Article II.
A panel of the D.C. Circuit took a step beyond Free Enterprise Fund in 2016, holding that
the single layer of for cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the Consumer
Financial Protection Board (CFPB) violated Article II. 5 The en banc D.C. Circuit overturned that
decision, but there are reasons to believe that final resolution of the issue is far from over. The
judge who wrote the panel opinion, Judge Kavanagh, was appointed to the Supreme Court, where
he will be in a better position to influence the outcome of the inevitable future disputes about the
scope of the removal power. In 2018, a panel of the Fifth Circuit renewed the dispute in an
analogous context by holding unconstitutional the for cause limit on the president’s power to
remove the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 6
This article looks at the history of Supreme Court cases addressing removal power. Based
on a discussion of those cases, including a landmark opinion written by former chief justice (and
former president) William Howard Taft, the article concludes that the Supreme Court should hold
that the president must have the power to remove at will any officer who performs executive
functions to enable the president to perform the functions vested in the president by Article II. By
contrast, the article concludes the Court should hold that due process precludes the president from
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having the power to remove at will an officer whose sole responsibilities are to adjudicate disputes
between private parties and the government.

Methodology and Findings
I began my effort to understand the scope issue by reading and studying with care all of the major
judicial decisions that have addressed the scope issue. I came away from that effort with two
pleasant surprises. First, with two exceptions, the opinions are better reasoned than I remembered.
Second, with the same two exceptions, the opinions form a coherent and consistent pattern. Courts
consistently protect the president’s power to perform the functions vested in him by Article II by
holding that he or one of his immediate subordinates must have the power to remove at will any
officer who performs purely executive functions. At the same time, courts consistently protect the
due process rights of parties to disputes with the government by limiting the power of the president
or an agency head to remove any officer who performs purely adjudicatory functions.

The President Must Have the Power to Remove at Will Officers Who Perform Executive
Functions
The logical starting point in any attempt to understand the opinions that address the scope of the
removal power is the 1926 opinion of Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States. 7 That opinion
upheld President Wilson’s decision to remove a postmaster from office. It is often described as
holding that Congress cannot limit in any way the president’s power to remove any officer. That
description is incomplete in ways that are misleading. Taft’s 71-page opinion addressed many
issues with care.
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Taft did not focus on President Wilson’s removal of postmaster Myers in the 1920s. He
focused primarily on President Andrew Johnson’s decision to remove the Secretary of War in the
1860s. He also did not address explicitly the issue that has drawn most of the attention of courts—
whether Congress can limit the president’s removal power by requiring a statement of cause for
removing an officer. The restriction on removal at issue in Myers was the Tenure in Office Act, a
statute that Congress enacted in 1867. That statute purported to limit the president’s removal power
by requiring the president to obtain the permission of the Senate before removing any officer. The
opinion in Myers was the logical antecedent to modern opinions like INS v. Chadha 8 and Bowsher
v. Synar, 9 in which the Court held that Congress cannot aggrandize itself by giving itself a role in
performing functions that are vested in the president by Article II.
Taft discussed in detail the controversy that led Congress to enact the Tenure in Office Act
and to impeach and to attempt to remove from office President Johnson for refusing to comply
with that statute by firing the Secretary of War without first obtaining the permission of the Senate.
Congress and President Johnson differed dramatically with respect to the most important question
at the time—how to reconstruct the country after the Civil War. Congress enacted the Tenure in
Office Act in an effort to make it impossible for President Johnson to exercise the powers vested
in him by Article II in the context of his attempt to reunite and reconstruct the country.
In the course of his lengthy opinion, Taft described and supported three broad propositions
that are important to an understanding of the removal power. First, he explained why the president
must be able to appoint many officers to be able to perform effectively the functions vested in the
president by Article II. The task is far too massive to be accomplished by a president without the
aid of agents. Second, he explained why the president must have the discretion to remove officers
at will. If an officer attempts to move the nation in a direction that is inconsistent with the
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president’s policies, the president cannot perform the functions vested in him by Article II unless
he has the discretion to remove that officer. Third, if Congress wants to make it impossible for the
president to perform the functions vested in him by Article II, it can do so most effectively by
limiting the power of the president to remove an officer. To chief justice (and former president)
Taft, it followed that Congress cannot limit the president’s discretion to remove officers with
executive functions.
I find Taft’s explanation of his three broad propositions persuasive, particularly coming
from a former president. Many of the most important later opinions repeat and build on Taft’s
reasoning and conclusions in Myers. Thus, for instance, the opinion in Free Enterprise Fund
supports its ban on multiple levels of for cause limits on the removal power with reference to the
reasoning in Myers. 10 The Free Enterprise Fund opinion supplements the reasoning in Myers with
reasoning based on political accountability, such as, the public cannot know who is responsible for
a government policy decision unless the president has the power to remove a policy making official
at will.
Similarly, Judge (now Justice) Kavanagh used reasoning like the reasoning in Myers,
supplemented by reasoning based on political accountability, in his opinion that held
unconstitutional the for cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the CFPB.
Thus, for instance, he emphasized that the director “unilaterally implements and enforces
[nineteen] federal consumer protection statutes, covering everything from home finance to credit
cards to banking practices.” 11 He reasoned that anyone with that broad range of executive
responsibilities must be removable by the president at will to allow the president to perform the
functions vested in him by Article II and to allow the public to hold the president accountable for
the policies the government adopts and attempts to further in each of the many contexts in which
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the director has the unilateral power to make and to implement policy on behalf of the government.
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in support of its holding that the for cause limit on the president’s
power to remove the director of the FHFA 12 is virtually identical to the reasoning in Judge (now
Justice) Kavanagh’s opinion with respect to the Director of the CFPB.
Taft’s opinion in Myers also includes another discussion that is important to an
understanding of the Court’s views with respect to the appropriate scope of the removal power. He
devoted four pages of his opinion to discussion of the postmaster’s argument that he could not be
removed at will because the Court had upheld limits on the power of the president to remove
territorial judges. 13 After discussing the conflicting opinions in which the Court had addressed that
question, the chief justice referred with apparent approval to the opinion of Justice McLean:

He pointed out that the argument upon which the decision rested was based on the necessity
for presidential removals in the discharge by the President of his executive duties and his
taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, and that such an argument could not apply
to the judges, over whose judicial duties he could not properly exercise any supervision or
control after their appointment and confirmation. 14

The chief justice then explicitly disavowed any intent to apply the reasoning and holding
in Myers to non-Article III judges:The question whether * * * Congress may provide
for [a territorial judge’s] removal in some other way present considerations different from
those that apply in the removal of executive officers, and therefore we do not decide them
15
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The opinion in Free Enterprise Fund includes a similar explicit disavowal of any intent to
apply its reasoning or holding to officers who perform adjudicative functions, noting that
“administrative law judges perform adjudicative functions rather than enforcement functions.” 16

Due Process Limits the Power to Remove Officers Who Perform Only Adjudicative
Functions
A few years after it issued its opinion in Myers, the Court issued its famous opinion in Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States. 17 The Court upheld the statutory for cause limit on the president’s power
to remove an FTC Commissioner. The opinion in Humphrey’s has traditionally been interpreted
to be inconsistent with the opinion in Myers and to authorize Congress to create agencies with vast
power that are “independent” of the president. Neither of those interpretations is supported by the
reasoning in the Humphrey’s opinion and the context in which the opinion was issued. The opinion
in Humphrey’s can support an interpretation that reconciles it with the opinion in Myers and that
does not legitimate the concept of multifunction agencies that are independent of the president.
The FTC of 1935 was nothing like the modern FTC or the agencies that have been the
subject of the recent decisions that have held invalid restrictions on the removal of officers—
PCAOB, CFPB, and FHFA. Each of those agencies has the power to make policy decisions on
behalf of the government by issuing legislative rules that have the same legally binding effect as a
statute. By contrast, the FTC of 1935 had no power to make policy through the issuance of rules
or through any other means.
The Court distinguished the functions performed by the FTC from the executive functions
performed by the officers who were the subject of the holding in Myers. The Court characterized
the FTC of 1935 as a “quasi legislative and quasi-judicial” body. 18 In its capacity as a quasi-
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legislative body, the FTC of 1935 performed the functions that are performed by congressional
staff and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) today. Congress had little staff support until
1946, and CRS was not created until 1970. 19 In 1935, Congress had to rely on the FTC to study
the performance of markets and to make recommendations with respect to the need to enact
legislation to authorize regulation of markets. FTC reports to Congress were the basis for many
statutes, including the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act. 20 It made sense for Congress
to insulate the officers in charge of conducting research for Congress from at will removal by the
president.
In its capacity as a quasi-judicial body, the FTC acted as a specialized forum to adjudicate
trade disputes. The Court analogized it to the Court of Claims. 21 In its adjudicative capacity, the
FTC of 1935 was also analogous to the Territorial Courts that the Myers Court distinguished from
agencies that perform executive functions. As the Myers Court recognized, the president “could
not properly exercise any supervision or control” over judges who were appointed to the Territorial
courts. 22 It follows that a for cause limit on the power of the president to remove a Commissioner
of the FTC of 1935 was entirely consistent with the holding in Myers that the president must have
the power to remove at will officers who perform executive functions.
The Court followed its opinion in Humphrey’s Executor with its 1958 opinion in Wiener
v. United States. 23 The Court held that the president could not remove a member of the threemember War Claims Tribunal without stating a cause for removal. Wiener can be interpreted to
support the proposition that due process limits the power of the president to remove an officer with
adjudicative responsibilities. There was no statutory limit on the president’s power to remove a
member of the War Claims Tribunal. The Court adopted a construction of the statute that included
such a limit because the Tribunal was tasked only with “adjudicating [claims] according to law,
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that is on the merits of each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal considerations.”24
The Court reasoned that Congress intended the members of the Tribunal to have the same freedom
from potential outside influences that the judges of the District Courts and the Court of Claims
had. 25 It followed that the president could not remove a member of the Tribunal without stating a
cause for removal.
In the meantime, Congress was engaged in a lengthy investigation and debate to devise and
implement means of assuring that the hearing examiners (later renamed ALJs) who presided in
hearings to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government did so in an unbiased
manner. 26 Many parties who participated in those adjudications complained that ALJs behaved in
ways that reflected a powerful bias in favor of the government. Many studies supported the claims
of bias.
After 17 years of investigation and debate, Congress addressed the problem of bias in 1946
by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by unanimous voice vote in both the House
and Senate. 27 The most important provisions of the APA are designed to assure that ALJs preside
over adjudicatory hearings in an unbiased manner. They include provisions that prohibit an agency
from determining the compensation of an ALJ, 28 assigning an ALJ responsibilities that are
inconsistent with the duties of an ALJ, 29 and, most important, removing or otherwise punishing an
ALJ. An ALJ can be removed only for cause found by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
after conducting a formal hearing. 30
In its 1950 opinion in Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 31 the Court praised Congress for
investigating the serious problem of bias in hearings conducted to adjudicate disputes between
private parties and the government. The Court also praised Congress for including in the APA
provisions that greatly reduced the risk of bias by protecting ALJs from agency pressure to conduct
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hearings in a manner that reflected bias in favor of the agency. 32 The Court compared the blatantly
biased hearing that the immigration service had provided the private party in the case before the
Court with the unbiased hearing that the APA assures. 33 The Court held the APA applicable to
immigration hearings even though Congress had not explicitly incorporated the APA safeguards
of independence in the Immigration Act. 34 The Court adopted a saving construction of the
Immigration Act to avoid having to hold the statute unconstitutional as a violation of due process. 35
Congress reacted angrily to the decision in Wong Yang Sun. It amended the Immigration
Act to make it explicit that the APA safeguards of the independence of ALJs did not apply to
immigration judges (IJs). Faced with a direct conflict between its views of due process and those
of Congress, the Court backed down and upheld the constitutionality of the amended Immigration
Act over an argument that it violates due process in its 1955 opinion in Marcello v. Bonds. 36 That
opinion is one of only two opinions on the removal power that were not well-reasoned and that do
not fit the otherwise consistent pattern of opinions that resolve scope of removal disputes based on
the functions performed by the officer whose removal is at issue.
In every other opinion, the Court distinguished clearly between officers who perform executive
functions and officers who perform adjudicative functions. The Court concluded that officers who
perform executive functions must be removable at will in order to assure that the president can
perform the functions vested in him by Article II. The Court concluded that officers who perform
adjudicative functions must be protected from at will removal in order to reduce the risk that they
will conduct adjudicatory hearings in ways that reflect pro-government bias in violation of due
process. The Court should overrule its holding in Marcello v. Bonds based on the powerful
reasoning in its opinion in Wong Yang Sun.
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Asylum cases provide the context in which it is most important to insure that officers with
adjudicative responsibilities are able to perform their duties without fear that they will be removed
or otherwise punished if they do not act in ways that reflect whatever bias the president and the
attorney general might have. Denial of a meritorious application for asylum is almost always
followed by removal of the alien from the United States. Thus, denial of a meritorious application
for asylum has devastating effects on the applicant, often including a high risk that the applicant
will be killed when the applicant is forced to return to the applicant’s country of origin.
The present circumstances illustrate the extreme risk of bias particularly well. Both the
president and the attorney general have expressed powerful antipathy toward aliens who seek
asylum and have applied extraordinary pressure on IJs to deny applications for asylum. That
pressure is virtually certain to influence at least some IJs to deny applications for asylum in some
cases in which their unbiased view of the merits would yield a decision granting the application. 37
The attorney general has the power to evaluate the performance of IJs and to remove an IJ at will.38
It is unrealistic to believe that all IJs will have the extraordinary courage and strength of character
required to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the expectations of the president and the
attorney general. The Supreme Court should put an end to the blatantly unconstitutional practice
of pressuring IJs to deny applications for asylum.
The only other opinion in which the Court departed from the important principles of
constitutional law that underlie most of its decisions was its 1988 opinion in Morrison v. Olson.39
The Court upheld the statutory for cause limit on the power of the Attorney General to remove an
independent counsel who had the power to investigate and potentially to prosecute a high-ranking
officer executive officer for allegedly engaging in criminal conduct. The Court held that the limit
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on the removal power was permissible even though the Court characterized prosecution as an
executive function. 40
As I have explained at length elsewhere, the opinion in Morrison did no harm because, as
the Court emphasized repeatedly, the independent counsel had no power to make any policy
decision. 41 The Court has never upheld a limit on the power to remove an officer who has the
power to make policy decisions on behalf of the government. That is by far the most important
function that is vested in the President in Article II.

Conclusion
I hope that the Supreme Court holds that the president must have the power to remove at will any
officer who performs executive functions to enable the president to perform the functions vested
in the president by Article II. I also hope that the Court holds that due process precludes the
president from having the power to remove at will an officer whose sole responsibilities are to
adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government. With one glaring exception, the
Court’s opinions are consistent with those principles when they are read with care and in the
context in which they were decided. I hope that the Court eliminates the one outlier by overruling
its 1955 decision in Marcello v. Bonds and holding that immigration judges cannot be removed at
will.
Richard J. Pierce Jr. is Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law at George Washington University. His
30 books and 130 articles on administrative law and government regulation have been cited in
hundreds of judicial opinions, including a dozen opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. He can be
contacted at rpierce@law.gwu.edu.
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